INTRODUCTION
Hotelling's [13] fundamental paper concernmg a spatial model with two facilities has influenced and inspired a large number of researchers mterested m compétitive location models. Hotelling's model was generalized as early as 1937 by Lerner and Singer [17] and later by Smithies [25] . Recent introductions to the field and reiated surveys are those by Gabszewicz and Thisse [10] and Eiselt and Laporte [5] ; a taxonomy and research bibliography is found in Eiselt et al, [8] .
Traditionally, prices and/or locations of the given facilities have been the décision variables in these models. The difficulties arising in models in which (*) Received May 1990 l 1 ) Faculty of Administration, University of New Brunswick, Fredencton, New Brunswick, Canada E3B 5A3 ( 2 ) Centre de Recherche sur les Transports, Université de Montréal, C P 6128, succursale A, Montréal, Québec, Canada H3C 3J7 priées and locations are both determined have been demonstrated by a number of authors, e. g., d'Aspremont et al [2] . Often, economists work with two-stage models where location is determined in the first stage and priées are found in the second stage. Such a two-stage model was originally developed by Hotelling; some newer références are Osborne and Pitchik [20] , Capozza and Van Order [1] and Hurter and Lederer [16] . On the other hand, other researchers frequently consider models with parametric priées and discuss scénarios in more realistic contexts -e. g., Eaton and Lipsey [3] , Osborne and Pitchik [19] and Fujita and Thisse [9] . Following the latter strand of research, we fix the price of the homogeneous good under considéra-tion and use only the locations of the two facilities as variables. Both facilities are assumed to be independently operated and their objective is assumed to be the maximization of their respective sales.
Most traditional models locate facilities on a linear market, i.e, a line segment, although there are some notable exceptions, such as Okabe and Suzuki [18] , Re Veile [24] and Eiselt and Laporte [6, 7] who locate facilities in the plane, on networks and on trees, respectively. In this study, both facilities locate on vertices of a tree. Also, demand originates only at vertices and is assumed to be totally inelastic with respect to distance or service le vel, i.e. customers will satisfy their demands no matter how far or unattractive the facility they buy from.
Formally, defïne a tree T=(V,E)
with , this expression must be interpreted as an arbitrarily large number. This attraction function is a generalization of the gravitational models used by Reilly [23] , Huff [14] and Huff and Jenks [15] . A customer will now patronize the facility he is more attracted to. Clearly, for any given pair of locations of A and B, each customer at vertex v t is either attracted more to A (in which case he will satisfy his entire demand b t from A) or to B (he then buys only from B) or he is equally attracted to both facilities, in which case each of the two facilities will satisfy half that customer's demand. Moreover, if we allow both facilities to locate at the same vertex, say v i9 we can distinguish between the case where the larger facility A captures the entire market ("winner takes all") in contrast to the "proportional model", where customers at v Naturally, for a given set of already located facilities, new facilities may now locate in order to maximize their sales. Suppose now that it were possible to relocate sequentially and repeatedly. The concept of sequential relocation coupled with facilities that optimize on the basis of the current situation has frequently been challenged. Indeed, if say, facility A were able to relocate now, why would it do so on the basis of the current situation knowing that facility B will relocate next and quite possibly negate the benefit that A dérives from its planning? In short, why not anticipate B'$ move and react accordingly? Such planning with foresight has successfully been applied in the case of linear markets, e. g., Prescott and Visscher [22] . Suppose now that it were known to all players that they will relocate in a spécifie séquence with unknown relocation speeds. As it may not be desired to anticipate an opponent's move some time in the (possibly distant) future, a possible shortterm objective is the maximisation of sales within the time interval where no other facility relocates.
Finally, define a pure strategy locational Nash equüibrium as a pair of locations (vf, vf) , so that neither facility may gain by relocating unilaterally. A formai characterization of such an equilibrium in the context of twoperson games is provided below in Définition 2.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we détermine equilibrium conditions for two facilities on a tree. In Section 3, we analyze the equilibrium problem as a two-person constant-sum game. We then study, in Section 4, the so-caled "First Entry Paradox" which states that the first facility to enter in a sequential location procedure does not necessarily have an advantage. The conclusion follows in Section 5.
EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS FOR TWO FACILITIES ON A TREE
In this section, we investigate existence conditions for the equilibrium of two facilities on a tree. To facilitate the discussion, we use the following notation. Let v q dénote any vertex in the tree T. Deletion of v q and of all its incident edges décomposes the tree into subtrees 7^,T|, . . 
VieT î

Facilities vvith equal weights
Assume first that the two facilities that are to be located on the tree may share a vertex. Let one of the facilities, say A 9 be located at vertex v q . Similar to the resuit on the linear market, facility B will either locate adjacent .to v q or also at v r If B locates adjacent to v q , it will do so in T\, as B captures the demand of the subtree in which it is located and, by définition, T\ is the largest such subtree. If v q happens to be a médian of T 9 then b(T\)^b(T)/2, as shown by Goldman and Witzgall [12] . If A and B both locate at a médian, each facility captures b(T)/2, As the maximum demand either facility can get by moving out of v q is b (T\), there is no incentive to relocate and hence a Nash equilibrium has been reached. An example for such a case is shown in figure 1 where v q = v 6 is the unique médian; hère and in similar figures, the numbers next to the vertices indicate their respective weights. The case of locating two equally weighted facilities at distinct vertices of a tree is similar. Suppose again that facility A has already located at the médian v q and, as above, the best B can do is locate next to v q in T\, Facility B then satisfies a demand of b{T\) whereas A captures b(T)-b{T\)^b(T\). Once more, neither facility can improve its position by relocating unilaterally and thus a Nash equilibrium has again been reached
Facilities vvith unequal weights
Consider now the case where the two facilities have unequal weights. As opposed to the equally weighted case where both facilities are drawn to each other and their behavior is totally symmetrie, we have to distinguish between the large and the small facility. For simplicity, consider fïrst the case of unequally weighted facilities on a linear market. Eiselt [4] has shown that the large facility will always locate arbitrarily close to the small facility thus capturing almost the entire market. On the other hand, the smaller facility will try to locate at a certain distance away from its larger competitor. Formally, let the market extend from 0 to 1, let w A >w B and assume that facility A is located at point x A . Without loss of generality assume x A^\ /2. Then facility B will locate at some point x B so that the left end of its market area V AB (B) coincides with the left end of the market at "0". In gênerai, for any two distinct locations of the facilities at x A and x B , V AB (B) is a nonsymmetric interval around x B , with the shorter end facing A whereas V AB (A) is the complement of V AB (B), Usually V AB (A) is disconnected.
A similar argument is applicable to the location of two facilities at the vertices of a tree. Here also, A will always locate at the same vertex as B or adjacent to B, as there is nothing to gain by moving farther away. On the other hand, B will move away from A but, based on the discrete structure of the market, not necessarily so far that the end of its market coincides with a leaf of the tree. This implies 
ANALYSIS OF THE EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM AS A TWO-PERSON CONSTANT-SUM GAME
In order to further analyze the situation, we will model the problem as a two-person constant-sum game. For that purpose, construct a payoff matrix P, so that the rows correspond to potential locations of facility B, the columns correspond to potential locations of facility A and p tj = b^ (B) dénotes the payoff of B if B locates at v t and A locates at Vj. Note that p ü is not defïned in contexts where A and B must locate at distinct vertices. Also note that P is not symmetrie [ho we ver, if w A = w B , then Pij -b(T)-p^ First we will outline a procedure for the détermination of P and then show how to find equilibria (if they-existé provided that the matrix P is available.
For each given pair of locations of A and B, V u (B) can be computed by determining the attractions of A and B at each customer location and finding the maximum. For each vertex, this is accomplished in 0(1) time. Since this task has to be repeated for ail vertices, each element of the matrix P can be found in O («) time. Knowledge of the entire matrix P is however not necessary. In order to find an equilibrium, Lemma 1 can be invoked to limit the number of required computations. As facilities will be adjacent at equilibrium, two possible location configurations must be examined for each edge e i} : A locates at v t and B at v j and vice versa. As there are n-1 edges in T, 2(n-1) pairs of locations have to be investigated leading to an O (n 2 ) algorithm. For this, it suffices to relabel every edge e u by e i{l)j{l) , where /=1, . ...,«-1. Then in the above procedure, the first two "do" loops are replaced by "for /:= 1 to n-1 do" and the instruction "set i: = i(l) andj:=y(0" is inserted before the first "if ' statement.
Suppose now that a payoff matrix P = (p^ is available. Then we can formally define a locational Nash equilibrium as follows. Similarly, a saddle point is definej as follows. Thèse définitions imply LEMMA 
4: If a pair of locations (v ( , v 3 ) defines a saddle point, then it is also a Nash locational equilibrium.
The converse of Lemma 4 is however not true as shown in the example displayed in figure 3 , where w A = 3, w B = 2, d u =\ for all e tj eE. Clearly, as r v = 6>5 = Cj,, P has no saddle point but the circled éléments in the payoff matrix indicate locationat Nash equilibria.
Facilities must locate at distinct vertices
Consider now the case where the faciiities have to locate at distinct vertices. In such a case, an equilibrium may or may not exist. ail e^eE, In the associated payoff matrix, r t = 1, i= 1, . . ., 11 and c = (Cj) = (5, 9/2, 4, 4, 3, 5/2, 3, 4, 4, 9/2, 5). As r^c,-for ail p ip there is no equilibrium.
Facilities may share the same vertex
Let us now examine the model where it is possible for both facilities to locate at the same vertex. As indicated above, we will distinguish between the "proportional" and the "winner takes all" models. for all eijEE. Whereas the model in figure 5 has exactly one equilibrium with both facilities locating at v 2 , the graph in figure 6 shows no equilibrium.
In our last model, both facilities may locate at the same vertex and if they do, the larger of the two facilities will capture the entire market. Assume now that there are at least two vertices with positive demands, say v t and v k . Thenp tj >0 andp ü = 0 for all i^j; p kj >0 andp kk -0 for all k^j. This implies that there exists at least one positive element in each column of P. Then by construction, r ; = 0 for all i and c,->0 for all j and hence no equilibrium can exist in this case.
The above results are summarized in table I.
THE FIRST ENTRY PARADOX
The concept of the flrst entry paradox has recently been put forward by Ghosh and Buchanan [11] . The basic idea behind the principle is that the first facility to enter the market in a sequential location procedure has an advantage as it can locate at a strategie site. Sometimes, however, facilities locating later in the process may have "the last word" and capture a larger share of the market than the facilities located earlier. Such a situation is referred to as the fïrst entry paradox. Note that the paradox assumes a completely symmetrie situation, Le. both facilities have access to the same information, resources, etc. Clearly, this assumption is not satisfied in a model where facility A has an obvious advantage by virtue of its larger weight and thus larger attraction. This nécessitâtes a slightly different formulation to the paradox. Suppose now that the two facilities locate sequentially. In anticipation of their opponent's counterstrategy, the first facility to locate will employ a maximin criterion. Thus, if facility B were to locate first, it would détermine r i * = max{r/}. Then facility A détermines its best counterstrategy given by the smallest element in row f* which is r f *; thus V' AB (B) = r i *. Similarly, if A locates first it will choose column j* so that c r = mïn{cj}. Subsequently, B j optimizes resulting in a payoff of Cp for B, i, e. V AB (B) = Cj*. Hence, we can write LËMMA 6: The fïrst entry paradox occurs if and only ifr^KCj*. For the following discussion it is useful to restate one of the fundamental theorems in game theory (see, for example Owen [21] ).
LEMMA 7: For any given payoff matrix P= max min {p tj } ^min max {p i} }.
As above, we will distinguish between two cases. Lemma 7 holds as long as all éléments of P are defined, i. e. both facilities are allowed to locate at the same vertex. In this case, maxlr^gminjc,}, i J meaning that the paradox always exists, except when the equality holds. This is, however, precisely the case when the game has a saddle point. Whenever B locates first, his payoff will be zero whereas if A locates first, B will be able to capture a demand of at least 2.
Facilities must locate at distinct vertices
Consider now the model where the facilities have to locate at distinct vertices and where Lemma 6 does not apply. It is easy to show that the first entry paradox never occurs for equally weighted facilities. As has been shown elsewhere (see Eiselt and Laporte [7] ), the first facility to locate, say A, would do so at a médian of the tree, say In the case of facilities with unequal weights, the paradox may or may not occur. Examples for both cases are provided by the graphs in figures 3 and 4 above. In the tree in figure 3 , B can obtain sales of 6 if it locates fîrst but it is guaranteed sales of only 5 units if A is the first facility to locate; hère the paradox does not occur. In figure 4 , facility B will be guaranteed one demand unit if B moves first whereas it will capture at least 5/2 units if A moves first, indicating that the paradox does occur. The above results are summarized in Table IL Finally, we would like to offer a few remarks on the process that takes place in case the first entry paradox exists. Clearly, in such a case neither facility has an incentive to make the first move. The spécifie rules of the game will then détermine the process that follows. If the market allows other facilities to enter or customer demand is likely to change in the long run, there may be an incentive for the two players to enter the market and secure some profit now rather that take a chance and risk getting very little or nothing at all later. This is actually another game whose solution dépends on the tradeoffs in the spécifie scenario under considération.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have examined the existence of equilibria in a compétitive duopoly model on a tree. Furthermore, conditions for the occurence of the first entry paradox were developed. Future research could investigate equilibria and paradox situations in gênerai graphs as well as in trees with more than two facilities.
